Roberto Simon

Roberto Simon, an editor and a policy-expert, has written one of the best accounts of Brazil's involvement with the Chilean politics during the 1970s. We discuss what Allende and his enemies had learned from the 1964 coup in Brazil, the military government's role in destabilizing his government, and their later efforts to aid Pinochet. 

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Evgeny: Hi Roberto, can you tell us about your background and how you became interested in the role of the Brazilian military regime in Chile's 1973 events?

Roberto: My name is Roberto Simon, and I'm a Brazilian journalist currently based in New York. I spent many years as a reporter for a major Brazilian newspaper, O Estado de S. Paulo, covering various topics in Latin America and the Middle East. My interest in the Brazilian military regime's involvement in Chile's 1973 events began when I went to Chile in 2013 to cover the presidential campaign. I came across an open secret that Brazil played a significant role during that time and decided to explore it further.

I initially spoke with British historian Tanya Harmer, who had written an important academic article on some documents from the Foreign Ministry Archives. Upon further investigation, I discovered a wealth of information detailing Brazil's actions during the Allende years, the coup, and their role in supporting the Pinochet  regime. This research led to the publication of several articles in Brazil, which garnered significant attention.

After my articles were published, Brazil's Truth Commission invited me to help with a few documents on the events that transpired in Chile and other countries in the Southern Cone. This collaboration inspired a publishing house to invite me to write a book about the story. It took me eight years to complete and involved extensive archival research in Chile, Brazil, the United States, and Europe. It was published in early 2021 in Portuguese, with a Spanish version scheduled for release next year, coinciding with the 50th anniversary of the Chilean coup.

THE BRAZILIAN COUP OF 1964

Evgeny: How did the pattern of Cold War coups emerge in Latin America?

Roberto: The Brazilian coup in 1964 marked the beginning of a series of Cold War coups there. They typically involved a center-left or leftist president being replaced by a military-backed violent anti-communist dictatorship, often with direct or indirect support from the United States. Following Brazil, similar events unfolded in Bolivia in 1970, Chile in 1973, and Argentina in 1976.

Evgeny: Could you briefly describe João Goulart's  presidency and the actions that led to his overthrow?

Roberto: João Goulart, or Jango, had a non-revolutionary platform. He aimed to implement broad reforms in Brazil, such as agrarian reform and possibly nationalizing a few entities. Goulart was not a revolutionary; rather, he was a landowner from Southern Brazil, following a long Brazilian tradition of labor reform through the state. However, he made some risky moves, such as supporting a rebellion of soldiers against the will of the generals, which contributed to his downfall.

Initially, the Kennedy administration was somewhat supportive of Jango Goulart. However, their stance quickly changed as they began to view him as potentially leading to the communization of Brazil and paving the way for communists to take power. This shift resulted in business groups and the military seeking direct US support, launching a propaganda campaign to create a sense of urgency to restore order in Brazil.

Evgeny: What role did the United States play in the 1964 Brazilian coup?

Roberto: The United States was very supportive of the coup in Brazil. The LBJ administration deployed a task force to assist the Brazilians if necessary, such as in the event of a civil war. The US Navy was prepared to support those attempting to overthrow Goulart. However, the coup was executed quickly and efficiently by the Brazilians themselves, and US intervention wasn't needed. After the coup, Jango Goulart and most of his cabinet supporters ended up in Montevideo, which became the first capital of the Brazilian exile community. Eventually, this community would relocate to Santiago.

Evgeny: What can you tell us about the political climate in Brazil under Goulart and how it influenced their relationship with Chile?

Roberto: Brazil was going through a major transformation at that time, with the coup leading to heightened tension and instability. Interestingly, when Brazil's first foreign minister visited Chile, he suggested that Frei , the Chilean president, might be similar to Kerensky, a reformer who initiates change but ultimately sparks a revolution that spirals out of control, leading to a communist government. This idea was expressed at the very beginning of their relationship.

When examining the Brazilian military regime's stance, there is a clear connection between their views during the two elections and their approach to Chile. President Médici, who was in power when Allende was elected in 1970, used the same language to describe the situation in Chile as the first foreign minister had previously. This continuity in perspective demonstrates a consistent concern about the potential for a communist revolution in Chile.

Evgeny: Can you give us an overview of Darcy Ribeiro's  role and influence on Latin American thought?

Roberto: Darcy Ribeiro was a prominent anthropologist and intellectual in Brazil from the 1950s to the 1960s, and continued to have an impact until his death a few decades ago. He was not only an academic, but also played a crucial role in policy-making, particularly in the Jango Goulart administration. He later fled to Chile, where he served as an advisor to President Allende and established strong connections with him. Ribeiro also advised Velasco Alvarado  in Peru.

Ribeiro was a monumental figure in Brazilian Marxism, but he was skeptical of the ultra-left. He opposed those who were pushing Allende to completely break with democracy, a group he referred to as the "desvairada" or the insane left. He believed in the Chilean process, which aimed to gain power through a broad coalition that included socialists and communists, as a window to the future. Ribeiro drew from his observations of Brazil's political landscape in 1964 and the mistakes that were made. He was a critical thinker and a Marxist who understood the nature of power in a distinctly Brazilian context.

ALLENDE AND BRAZIL

Evgeny: Can you describe Salvador Allende's relationship with Goulart and his involvement in the events surrounding the Brazilian coup?

Roberto: Salvador Allende was a renowned leftist in Latin America during the mid-'60s when Goulart was overthrown. He was a founder of OSPAAAL in Cuba and a key voice in support of the Cuban Revolution . Although Allende, then a senator in Chile, did not travel to Brazil, he did visit Goulart in Montevideo after the coup. Allende also supported protests against the overthrow of Goulart's government.

In the beginning, Allende did speak in Chile's Congress in defense of Goulart and criticized the Brazilian dictatorship. However, his involvement with Brazil was limited. He became more connected to Cuba and Guatemala, two chapters of Latin American history he cared deeply about. The coup in Guatemala  was a turning point for Allende, causing him to change his view on the United States and its role in Latin America. This transformation happened not only with Allende but also with many leaders of the South American and Latin American left.

Evgeny: How did Allende's views on the United States evolve over time?

Roberto: Allende started to see Washington as a new colonial power in the region, and his thoughts became more internationalized after Árbenz  was overthrown in Guatemala. Though he had already traveled to places like China and Korea during the war, it was this event that turned him into a Latin Americanist.

Allende was initially skeptical of the Cuban Revolution, but after meeting Che Guevara and Fidel Castro , he fell in love with it and became one of its greatest supporters in Latin America. His family even became directly involved with armed struggle in South America, supported by Cuba.

Allende believed that Chilean democracy was exceptional by South American standards. He saw Chile as a functioning democracy with real parties and a strong electoral system, and he thought the center-right and the right in Chile would respect the results and cooperate with a leftist government. He didn't expect the level of violence that occurred from the outset, such as the assassination of General Schneider , nor did he anticipate the increased politicization of the armed forces.

Evgeny: What were the factors that led the U.S. to support the Christian Democrats  in South America during that period?

Roberto: The U.S. saw the Christian Democrats as an ideal partner in South America because they represented a break from the traditional right-wing power structure in Latin America. They were reformers, primarily composed of middle-class, urban individuals, rather than the reactionary class of landowners. As a result, the U.S. provided significant financial support to their campaigns, investing millions of dollars, which was an immense amount at the time. Meanwhile, the Cubans, albeit on a smaller scale, were supporting the left.

Evgeny: How would you describe Allende’s place in Chilean politics prior to his election?

Roberto: Allende was a unique figure as he managed to combine two seemingly contradictory roles. He excelled as a professional politician, maneuvering in Congress, building coalitions, and eventually becoming president. At the same time, he was a revolutionary who was passionate about the Cuban Revolution and supported the armed struggle in Latin America and beyond. He was an advocate for international socialism and was a founder of OSPAAAL, an organization promoting revolutions across Latin America.

Evgeny: How was the Chilean revolution different from other socialist revolutions?

Roberto: Chile's attempt to bring about revolution through democratic means was an unprecedented project. Unlike European leftists who aimed to reform capitalism, Allende's goal was to build socialism by nationalizing the economy and transferring the means of production from the private sector to the state. This revolution was to be accomplished through democracy and government, instead of resorting to armed struggle. Chile had a robust democracy, which allowed for this unique experiment where a socialist leader could rise to power through democratic means and initiate a true revolution.

Evgeny: How did Allende's vision differ from that of his predecessor, Eduardo Frei?

Roberto: While Chile was already leaning towards the left during Frei's tenure, with movements to nationalize the copper industry and establish closer ties to Cuba, Frei was more of a reformer rather than a revolutionary. Many people felt that he was not delivering enough change, so in the 1970 election, Allende became the inevitable choice for those who sought more radical transformation. Allende's vision involved a genuine commitment to building socialism and implementing revolutionary changes, which set him apart from Frei and attracted those who were dissatisfied with the Christian Democrats.

Evgeny: How would you describe Allende's personal style and how did it contrast with other Latin American left-wing leaders of the time?

Roberto: Allende had a distinctly bourgeois style. When the US military attaché first met him, he referred to him as a Chilean Vanderbilt. Allende was a man who enjoyed sailing in Viña Del Mar and Valparaiso, drinking scotch, and collecting art. He wasn't a revolutionary like many other Latin American left-wing leaders of the time, as he had no experience in guerrilla warfare and didn't even know how to shoot a gun.

Evgeny: Can you tell me about the relationship between Allende and Raúl Rettig ?

Roberto: In the 1950s, Allende and Rettig were both senators and bitter rivals in the Chilean Senate. They argued about everything and one day things escalated to the point where they agreed to a duel. They went through with the duel in the early hours of the morning on a mountain. Fortunately, no one was killed or injured. Later, during a political crisis in Chile, they became not only allies but good friends. Rettig was a member of the Radical Party, which was a traditional party and the only non-Marxist party in Allende's Unidad Popular  coalition.

Evgeny: How did Allende utilize the Radical Party and Rettig in his foreign relations strategy?

Roberto: Allende relied heavily on the Radical Party, especially for relations with countries like Brazil and the United States. He used radical politicians to send messages to the US. At the beginning of his administration, Allende offered Rettig several ambassadorial positions, including in the Soviet Union and Mexico. However, he emphasized that he really wanted Rettig in Brazil, as he believed Brazil would be the focus of international and regional pressure against Chile. Rettig ultimately accepted the position in Brazil.

Evgeny: Can you tell us about Câmara Canto's  role in Chile and the network he built there?

Roberto: Ambassador Câmara Canto was Brazil's ambassador to Chile, and he was a dedicated anti-communist with experience serving in Franco's Spain. Upon arriving in Chile in the late 1960s, he effectively built a strong network of contacts within the military, business community, and political sphere, mainly from the center and right.

US AND BRAZIL CONSPIRE AGAINST ALLENDE

Evgeny: How did the Brazilian and American governments react to Allende's win?

Roberto: Both Brazil and the United States were surprised by Allende's victory. Brazil quickly started assessing the situation, trying to determine whether the Chilean military would act to block Allende's presidency before he took office. Câmara Canto spoke with various generals, businesspeople, and politicians, but concluded that the generals were not prepared to act at the time. In contrast, in Washington, President Nixon and Henry Kissinger  ordered U.S. intervention in an attempt to stop Allende or prevent him from becoming president.

Evgeny: What were the reasons that prevented the Chilean generals from acting against Allende right after the election?

Roberto: There were a few reasons. Firstly, the military lacked a natural leader who could unite and organize the armed forces to overthrow Allende. Secondly, those who were trying to prevent the left from gaining power failed to build the necessary networks with the business community and military to create a foundation for an anti-communist regime.

Evgeny: Do you know anything about the United States’ plans to intervene in Chile?

Roberto: The United States devised a two-track plan to intervene. Track I involved the U.S. ambassador using all available means to persuade people, including Congress members and military personnel, to find an institutional alternative that would block Allende's presidency. Track II focused on supporting the most radical elements within the military, including retired personnel, to stop Allende by force.

Evgeny: How did the United States' involvement impact General René Schneider, and what was the significance of his death in Chilean politics?

Roberto: General René Schneider, who held a position equivalent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the United States, was targeted by a commando unit supported by Track II. They planned to kidnap him, but when he resisted, they killed him instead. His assassination marked a turning point in Chilean politics as political violence took center stage. Interestingly, this event coincided with Allende gaining enough support to become president. The Christian Democrats initially condemned Schneider's assassination and supported Allende's government under certain conditions, but they eventually withdrew their support and joined the opposition. This was when the political landscape in Chile became more volatile.

Evgeny: Can you elaborate on ITT's  involvement in Chile and its influence on the Nixon administration's perception of Allende?

Roberto: ITT, a major multinational company, played a direct role in financially supporting radical groups trying to block Allende, including the group responsible for General Schneider's death. Notably, former CIA director John McCone  served on ITT's board, which may have contributed to the company's belief that they could wield significant power. ITT had strong connections in Washington, which allowed them to draw the Nixon administration's attention to Chile. Before ITT's intervention, the State Department and the US ambassador in Chile viewed Allende as a manageable problem and expected to deal with him until the next elections in 1976. However, ITT's influence led to a shift in perception, and Allende was suddenly considered a major threat to US national interests.

Evgeny: What was the role of Brazil's National Confederation of Industry in supporting Chile's business community after Allende's election?

Roberto: They backed their sister organization in Chile responsible for congregating the main industrial powers in the country. The CNI dispatched a plane full of businessmen to Chile in 1970, immediately after Allende's election. These businessmen were sent to discuss the events that took place in Brazil in 1964, to show solidarity, and to reassure the Chilean business communities that opposed Allende that they were not alone. They were prepared to mobilize support from other parts of Latin America, the United States, and beyond against Allende's administration.

Evgeny: Were there any connections between right-wing terrorist groups in Chile and Brazil during this time?

Roberto: Although I didn't find any concrete documents to confirm this, there are testimonies suggesting that the most radical groups in Chile, such as right-wing terrorist organizations, received training and possibly arms from Brazil. I tried to use the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to request information from the CIA and the State Department about the ties between Patria y Libertad , a Chilean radical group, and similar movements in Brazil. I am confident that these connections existed, as I interviewed the number two of Patria y Libertad who explicitly stated that, during the Allende administration, the group had an operational base in Brazil. It is highly likely that money and weapons from Brazil were funneled to Chile at that time.

Evgeny: How did Brazil influence Chile's political landscape during this period, and what kind of support did it offer to the Chilean right?

Roberto: Brazil had a significant impact on Chile's political situation by offering a model for them to follow. According to an influential military leader interviewed by The Washington Post, Brazil provided a recipe for the Chileans, who could replicate what Brazil had done in 1964. There are numerous similarities between the two situations – the role of the business community working in tandem with the military, as well as the close ties between these groups, the church, and the media. Brazil's "soft power" was instrumental in influencing the Chilean right during this period.

AFTER THE COUP

Evgeny: What role did Brazil play in the international recognition of Pinochet's regime?

Roberto: When the coup took place, Brazil was the first country to recognize Pinochet's regime. They quickly provided humanitarian and economic aid to Chile, and within a month, Brazilian intelligence officials were inside the national stadium, which had become a prison camp, assisting Chilean torturers in interrogating people. From Washington, Kissinger observed this and noted that in 1964, the United States had been the first to recognize the Brazilian military dictatorship, but in 1973, they could let Brazil take the lead with Chile. At the time, the Nixon administration was under pressure due to allegations of CIA meddling in Chile and supporting radical groups attempting to overthrow Allende.

Brazil became a strong advocate for Chile all over the world, even with European countries that were initially reluctant to establish ties with Pinochet's government, such as West Germany. Despite news of torture and execution in Chile, Brazil lobbied Bonn to establish direct connections with the Pinochet regime and start working with them. In fact, the Brazilian ambassador to the UN even wrote the speech given by the Chilean ambassador at the UN to help defend Chile against the international campaign condemning the 1973 coup.

Evgeny: What can you tell us about Brazil's role in the training of the Chilean intelligence services?

Roberto: Brazilian officials were in Chile right after the coup, offering training to the Chilean repression service and intelligence agents. They were even present in the Estadio Nacional, assisting torturers and interrogators. A Brazilian soldier, who was at the Estadio Nacional, admitted to witnessing torture there.

Brazil offered extensive training to DINA , which was compared to the Gestapo by a State Department official. At the time, Chile lacked experience in building such a repressive regime and an intelligence agency for torturing and persecuting its own people. Brazil stepped in, and dozens of Chilean DINA members were trained at the ESNI, the school of the Brazilian National Information Service. Some of these trainees were later involved in high-profile assassinations, such as those of General Prats  in Argentina and Letelier in Washington, D.C.

Evgeny: How did Ernesto Geisel’s ascent to power influence Brazil’s relationship with Chile?

Roberto: When Geisel became president, Brazil began moving in a different direction from Chile. Geisel aimed to gradually open the regime, preparing the ground for the return of civilian power. The military would control the process, implement amnesty, and change the party system in Brazil. While Brazil wanted Pinochet to succeed in stabilizing Chile and defeating the Chilean left, Pinochet's growing reputation as the embodiment of human rights violations in Latin America posed a problem for Geisel and his aides, as Brazil tried to distance itself from being just another Latin American dictatorship.

OPERATION CONDOR & BRAZIL

Evgeny: In what ways was Brazil involved in Operation Condor ?

Roberto: When the coup happened in Chile, the Brazilian ambassador to Santiago requested lists of Brazilians with affiliations to Chilean political parties, expired tourist visas, or who had served in the Chilean government. Initially, the Chileans claimed they couldn't provide this information because La Moneda , where the data was stored, was burning. However, when Pinochet visited Brazil in March 1974, he brought all the requested data, which was then handed over to the Brazilian Foreign Ministry's intelligence. This led to discussions on sharing intelligence, building direct channels of communication, and establishing rules for sharing information. Operation Condor emerged from this context in 1975.

It's important to note that Brazil was involved in tracking and targeting political opponents in Argentina, Uruguay, and other countries since the mid to late '60s, long before Operation Condor. Condor, however, represented a more formalized and structured collaboration among South American dictatorships. It was proposed by Pinochet in 1975, and its first meeting was held in Santiago, with representatives from Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil. While Brazil didn't sign the agreement during the first meeting, it joined the following year. The main idea behind Condor was to create an "Interpol" for repression in South America, with countries collaborating to build a database and share intelligence. Brazil even offered to provide the communication system, known as Condortel .

Brazil was invited to participate in Operation Condor from the beginning, but during the first meeting, it only sent two lower-ranking officials as observers and didn't sign the agreement. Brazil joined the following year and played a significant role by offering to provide the communication system, Condortel, which facilitated the sharing of intelligence among participating countries. Each country had a code name, with Brazil being Condor Six. Despite not being a signatory during the first meeting, Brazil eventually became an active participant in the decision-making processes of Operation Condor.

Evgeny: What were the main reasons behind Brazil's decision to undermine Operation Condor, considering it was a part of it?

Roberto: Firstly, Brazil had already eliminated the armed left within its borders, so there wasn't a significant internal threat from them. Secondly, Brazil saw itself as an emerging global power with ambitions that surpassed being part of a multinational effort led by Chile. The Brazilian military did not want to follow Pinochet, and they were more interested in maintaining their global image and national interests.

Evgeny: What was Brazil's stance on Operation Teseo, the killing squad meant to operate in Europe?

Roberto: Brazil had no interest in participating in Operation Teseo, as it was dangerous for their international image at the time. They wanted to demonstrate that they were not just another South American dictatorship and were working towards a political transition. This included the promise of a more open government, a move towards civilian power, and the eventual withdrawal of the armed forces from the political stage.

Roberto Simon discuses his book on Brazil's interventions in Chile

Evgeny: How did Brazil's relationship with the United States during the Carter administration influence its actions in relation to Operation Condor?

Roberto: Brazil played an ambiguous role during the Carter administration. While other South American countries were building a cohesive front against President Carter's human rights policy, Brazil undermined that effort by revealing their plans to the U.S. Brazil didn't want to see the region divided by antagonism between South American dictatorships and the United States.

Brazil preferred bilateral collaboration with countries such as Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, as it allowed them to exert more control over the process. Joining Operation Condor would have created a "Frankenstein's monster" with many risks for Brazil, so they opted for a more controlled, one-on-one approach that better aligned with their national interests.